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VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE CHILDREN AREN’T REAL, BUT THE DANGERS ARE; 
 WHY THE ASHCROFT COURT GOT IT WRONG 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One need not look any further than the items in his own home to realize how much 
technology has progressed in the last two decades.  In the world of televisions we have gone 
from the 1991 Zenith Advanced System 3 to now fifty plus inch high definition and 3D liquid 
crystal display (LCD) televisions.  In video gaming we have progressed from the pixilated 
images in Sega Genesis and Nintendo to the XBOX360 and PlayStation3, with games such as 
Call of Duty and Madden NFL using motion-capture technology and state-of-the-art CGI 
technology to give us the most life-like humans to date.  In Hollywood you have movies, such as 
this summer’s blockbuster Rise of the Planet of the Apes, which used “CGI technology to create 
what looks to be the most realistic depiction yet of a humanised ape.”1  As technology has 
progressed, we are rapidly approaching a point, if not already there, where virtual images and 
videos are nearly indistinguishable from their real-life counterparts.  In the realm of child 
pornography, this poses a dangerous and difficult problem.  In the nine years since Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition we have gotten to a point where virtual child pornography can pose just as 
much harm to children as actual child pornography.  Though virtual child pornography does not 
entail the abuse of real children, real children can still be victims.  Because of the indirect harm 
to children that virtual child pornography causes, there are legitimate and compelling State 
interests in classifying virtual child pornography as a category of material wholly outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. 
                                                 
1
 Graham Smith, Fans Go Bananas for New Planet Of The Apes Trailer Which Takes Humanised Monkey Effects to 
a Whole New Level, MAIL ONLINE (April, 14 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1376448/Rise-
Of-The-Planet-Of-The-Apes-Fans-bananas-new-clip.html. 
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 This paper will first discuss the compelling State interests for prohibiting actual child 
pornography, as discussed in New York. v. Ferber.  Next it will discuss the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 and how it was found unconstitutional by the Court in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition.  Part four will explain why the Court in Ashcroft got it wrong, and part five 
will give an alternative means of combating virtual child pornography under the analysis in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.  Finally part six will address the aftermath of Ashcroft, Congress’ passing 
of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, and the case that sustained it, United States v. Williams.  
II. NEW YORK V. FERBER 
The first case to tackle the issue of actual child pornography was New York v. Ferber.  
Ferber dealt with a New York statute that prohibited a person from “knowingly promoting a 
sexual performance by a child under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such a 
performance.”2  In holding that the statute did not violate the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court offered five reasons why the States were entitled to greater freedom in regulating child 
pornography.
3
 
A. Compelling State Interests 
First and foremost, the State has a “compelling” interest in “safeguarding the physical 
and psychological well-being of a minor.”4  After reviewing the legislative findings that 
accompanied the passage of the statute, the Court found that preventing the sexual exploitation 
and abuse of children “constituted a government objective of surpassing importance.”5  In 
passing the statute, the legislature found that using children as subjects in pornographic materials 
                                                 
2
 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 747 (1982). 
3
 See id. at 756. 
4
 Id. at 757. 
5
 Id. 
3 
 
was harmful to the emotional, physiological, and mental health of the children used in the 
production.
6
  When children are sexually exploited, studies haves shown that they tend to be 
unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships later on in life, to become sexual abusers in 
adulthood, and to have a variety of sexual dysfunctions.
7
  These children are predisposed to self-
destructive behavior such as drug and alcohol abuse or prostitution.  In other words, being 
subjects of pornographic productions is both harmful to the children and to society as a whole.
8
  
Therefore, as the legislature in NY found, the care of children, being a sacred trust, should not be 
abused by profit-seeking persons through a commercial network based on sexual exploitation of 
children, and for that reason the “public policy of the state demand[ed] the protection of children 
from exploitation through sexual performances.”9  The Court referred to its decision in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, saying that a “democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, 
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,”10 and stated that as a result 
“we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of 
youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected 
rights.”11  After mentioning that virtually all the States had passed legislation combating child 
pornography, the Court found that the regulation of child pornography “easily passes muster 
under the First Amendment.”12 
                                                 
6
 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
7
 See id. (citing Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J.AM.ACAD.CHILD PSYCHIATRY 
289, 296 (1980)). 
8
 See id. 
9
 Id. at 757. 
10
 Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, (1944)). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
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Second, the government has an interest in “closing the distribution network and drying up 
the market for child pornography.”13  The Court found the distribution of child pornography to 
be “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways.14  “First, the 
materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the 
child is exacerbated by their circulation.”15  Pornography actually poses a greater threat to the 
child than does sexual abuse because of the fact that the misdeed is recorded and thus can haunt 
the child in future years, long after it originally took place.
16
  The child victim is most harmed by 
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping what happened a secret and it is this knowledge 
of publication that “increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”17  Secondly 
“the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material 
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.”18  It is nearly 
impossible to stop the progress of the exploitation of children by only going after the people who 
produce it.
19
  As Charles Rembar said during the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1977, “it is an impossible prosecutorial job to try and get at 
the acts themselves.”20  Although the production of these materials is a low-profile, clandestine 
industry, “the need to market the resulting products requires a visible apparatus of 
distribution.”21  Therefore, “[t]he most expeditious if not the only practical method of law 
enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties 
                                                 
13
 Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. 
& POL'Y 1, 6 (2007) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760). 
14
 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
15
 Id. 
16
 See id. at 760 (citing Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST 
L.REV. 535, 545 (1981)). 
17
 Id. at 760. 
18
 Id. at 759. 
19
 See id. at 760. 
20
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760 
21
 Id. 
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on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.”22  The Court compared 
child pornography with materials that are legally obscene under the Miller test
23
, and said that 
while “some States may find that this approach properly accommodates its interests, it does not 
follow that the First Amendment prohibits a State from going further.”24  The Court reasoned 
that the State has a “more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual 
exploitation of children,” and thus, the standard adopted under Miller “bears no connection to the 
issue of whether a child has been physically harmed or psychologically harmed in the production 
of the work.”25  The Court was not convinced that the Miller standard was a satisfactory solution 
to the problem of child pornography, so, for example, a sexually explicit depiction of a real child 
need not be “patently offensive” in order to be prohibited.  Again, “a work which, taken on the 
whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless embody 
the hardest core of child pornography.”26  The Court found that it “is irrelevant to the child [who 
has been abused] whether or not the material . . . has a literary, artistic, political or social 
value.”27 
For its third reason, the Court said that “the advertising and selling of child pornography 
provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, 
an activity illegal throughout the Nation.”28  In other words, the selling of child pornography is 
inherently linked with the production of child pornography, an activity that is illegal due to the 
                                                 
22
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760. 
23
 “Today we would add a new three-pronged test: ‘(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.’” Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973). 
24
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760-61. 
25
 Id. at 761. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. (citing Memorandum from Assemblyman Lasher in Support of N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 2006)). 
28
 Id. 
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numerous statutes that were in place that outlawed the employment of children in these kinds of 
films and photographs.  The Court referred to Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., saying that 
it has rarely “been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends to 
immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal 
statute.”29  Therefore, if the constitutional freedom for speech and press did not extend to the 
production of child pornography, it certainly would not extend to the advertising and selling of 
child pornography. 
The Court’s fourth reason for why the States were entitled to greater freedom in 
regulating child pornography was that the “value of permitting live performances and 
photographic reproductions” of minors engaged in sexual conduct “is exceedingly modest, if not 
de minimis,” and therefore considered it unlikely that child pornography “would often constitute 
an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work.”30 
As for the fifth reason, the Court found that “recognizing and classifying child 
pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not, 
incompatible with our earlier decisions.”31  Child pornography “bears so heavily and pervasively 
on the welfare of children engaged in its production,” and is therefore “without the protection of 
the First Amendment.”32  As Justice Stevens said in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 
“[t]he question whether speech is, or is not protected by the First Amendment often depends on 
the content of speech,” and “it is the content of [an] utterance that determines whether it is a 
protected epithet or an unprotected ‘fighting comment.’”33  When it comes to content-based 
classifications, such as child pornography, the Court found that often times those classifications 
                                                 
29
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). 
30
 Id. at 762-63. 
31
 Id. at 763. 
32
 Liu, supra note 13, at 7 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763). 
33
 Young v. American Mini Theatre, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) 
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have “been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the 
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”34  In other 
words, child pornography is so repugnant that it significantly outweighs any expressive interests 
that may come from it, and therefore a bright-line rule prohibiting it is more appropriate than 
requiring a case-by-case analysis.  “For child pornography, ‘the balance of competing interests is 
clearly struck . . . and it is permissible to consider’ it unprotected.”35 
B. Direct Harm v. Indirect Harm 
The Court in Ferber discussed two types of harms that were caused by actual child 
pornography.  There was the “direct harm” to the actual children who were the subjects of the 
child pornographic materials.  “This harm to their physical, physiological, mental, psychological, 
and emotional well being is brutish and pervasive,” and “this harm also includes the additional 
trauma caused to these children when the pornographic materials are advertised, distributed, and 
circulated.”36  There was also an “indirect harm” that the Court spoke of.  Pedophiles often will 
use child pornography to exploit and abuse other children.  In enacting certain child pornography 
statutes, Congress found that child pornography often was used by pedophiles to stimulate and 
whet their own sexual appetites, and furthermore they would often use it to seduce other children 
into sexual activity.
37
  “[A] child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to 
pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of 
other children ‘having fun’ participating in such activity.”38  Often times, “one child’s 
memorialized incident of sexual abuse is . . . used to victimize additional children in the 
                                                 
34
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64. 
35
 Liu, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764). 
36
 Id. 
37
 See Congressional Findings (3), (4), Pub. L. 104-208, notes following 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251. 
38
 Id. 
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future.”39  Therefore the creation and distribution of child pornography not only directly harms 
the subjects of those materials, but it promotes the infliction of indirect harm on new victims; 
this harm is facilitated by the network that is the market for child pornography.
40
 
C. Indirect Harm: The Link Between Child Pornography and Child Molesting 
  Exact percentages vary, but experts have come to a general conclusion that there is in 
fact some link between viewing child pornography and sexually molesting children.  A study by 
the New Zealand Internal Affairs suggested that there was “an association between viewing child 
pornography and committing child sexual abuse.”41  A New York Times article in 2007 
discussed a new controversial government study of convicted Internet offenders.
42
  The research 
was carried out by psychologists at the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and found that many men who 
claim to be “just looking at pictures” could, in fact, be predators.43  In the study, 155 male 
inmates, all serving sentences for possession or distribution of child pornography, had 
volunteered for the 18 month treatment program at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, 
N.C.
44
  More than 85 percent admitted to abusing at least one child, compared to the 26 percent 
that were known to have done so at the time of sentencing.
45
  The psychologists who conducted 
the study, Andres E. Hernandez and Michael L. Bourke, concluded that “many Internet child 
pornography offenders may be undetected child molesters.”46  One convicted pedophile serving a 
                                                 
39
 Candace Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing Child Pornography and Molesting 
Children, CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION UPDATE. VOL. 1(NO. 3) (2004), available at 
http://www.ndaa.org/publications/newsletters/child_sexual_exploitation_update_volume_1_number_3_2004.html. 
40
 See Liu, supra note 13, at 9. 
41
 Archive of Statistics on Internet Dangers, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH (2006), 
http://www.enough.org/inside.php?tag=stat%20archives# (citing Caroline Sullivan, Internet Traders of Child 
Pornography: Profiling Research, NEW ZEALAND’S DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (October 2005), 
http://www.dia.govt.nz/pubforms.nsf/URL/Profilingupdate2.pdf/$file/Profilingupdate2.pdf). 
42
 See Julian Sher and Benedict Carey, Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?ref=childpornography. 
43
 See id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
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14-year sentence said that viewing child pornography gave him no release from his desires, but 
instead the exact opposite, furthering the sentiment that some men convicted of sexually abusing 
children had their urges fueled by child pornography.
47
  The pedophile was interviewed and 
quoted as saying: 
[T]here is no way I can look at a picture of a child on a video screen and not get 
turned on by that and want to do something about it.  I knew that in my mind.  I 
knew that in my heart.  I didn’t want it to happen, but it was going to happen.48 
 
 Although that controversial study put the number at 85 percent, most other studies have 
put the correlation rate in the 40 percent range.  “Forty percent of people charged with child 
pornography also sexually abuse children.  But finding the predators and identifying the victims 
are daunting tasks.”49  A 2000 study issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons found that “76 
percent of offenders convicted of internet-related crimes against children admitted to contact sex 
crimes with children previously undetected by law enforcement and had an average of 30.5 child 
sex victims each.”50  According to the Mayo Clinic of the U.S.A., studies and case reports put 
that correlation rate between child pornography and child molesting between 30 and 80 
percent.
51
  During one study, the majority of men who had been charged with or convicted of 
child pornography offenses showed pedophilic profiles on phallometric testing.
52
 
                                                 
47
 See Sher & Carey, supra note 42. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Archive of Statistics on Internet Dangers, supra note 41 (citing Reuters, 2003). 
50
 Kim, supra note 39 (citing Internet Child Pornography: Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security, Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Michael J. Heimbach, Crimes 
Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI)). 
51
 See Ryan C.W. Hall and Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, 
Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS (Apr. 2007),  
http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.com/content/82/4/457.full. 
52
 See Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor, and Ray Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses Are a Valid Diagnostic 
Indicator of Pedophilia. JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 115.3 (2006): 610-15. “Phallometric testing. 
Clinicians and researchers use phallometry to quantify the sexual interests of sexual offenders against children (e.g., 
Howes, 1995). A meta-analytic review of 61 sex offender follow-up studies found that phallometrically assessed 
sexual arousal to children was the strongest predictor of subsequent sexual offenses among all the variables that 
were examined (Hanson & Bussie`re, 1998). The specific protocol in use at the Kurt Freund Laboratory over the 
10 
 
Our results indicate that child pornography offending is a valid diagnostic 
indicator of pedophilia. Child pornography offenders were significantly more 
likely to show a pedophilic pattern of sexual arousal during phallometric testing 
than were comparison groups of offenders against adults or general sexology 
patients. In fact, child pornography offenders, regardless of whether they had a 
history of sexual offenses against child victims, were more likely to show a 
pedophilic pattern of sexual arousal than were a combined group of offenders 
against children. Our results suggest that child pornography offending might be a 
stronger indicator of pedophilia than is sexually offending against a child.
53
 
 
A 1987 report by the U.S.A. National Institute of Justice said that there was a “disturbing 
correlation” between viewing child pornography and sexually abusing children.54 
 From January 1997 through March 2004, 620 of the 1,807 child pornographers that were 
arrested, approximately 34 percent, were confirmed child molesters.
55
  The United States Postal 
Inspection Service, which compiles data based upon evidence derived from child pornography 
crime scene investigations and police reports, found that at least 80 percent of purchasers of child 
pornography were active abusers and nearly 40 percent of the child pornographers investigated 
during the last few years had sexually molested children in the past.
56
  Internet Crimes Against 
Children (ICAC) task forces in states such as Pennsylvania and Texas found that 51 percent and 
32 percent, respectively, of individuals that were arrested for viewing child pornography were 
also molesting children, or had done so in the past, further confirming “the positive correlation 
between the possession of child pornography and the commission of crimes against children.”57  
Sexual predators will use child pornography as a means of assisting them in the grooming 
                                                                                                                                                             
course of the present investigation reliably distinguishes pedophilic from teleiophilic men (i.e., men who prefer 
sexually mature persons). Blanchard et al. (2001) have described the phallometric testing procedure and data 
preparation in detail. Briefly, a computer records penile blood volume while the patient observes a standardized set 
of stimuli that depict persons of potential sexual interest. Changes in penile blood volume (i.e., his degree of penile 
erection) indicate his relative sexual interest in each stimulus category.” Id. at 611. 
53
 Id. at 613. 
54
 See “Remarks of Arnold I Burns Before the Florida Law Enforcement Committee on Obscenity, Organized Crime 
and Child Pornography”. NCJ 109133. National Institute of Justice. 1987-12-03. 
55
 See Kim, supra note 39. 
56
 See Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and the Constitution: Before the Senate Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Ernie Allen, Director, The National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children). 
57
 Kim, supra note 39. 
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process, helping break down the child’s barriers to sexual behavior, making the child feel at ease, 
and additionally communicating the predator’s sexual fantasies to the child.58  Child 
pornography, while reinforcing fantasies, is often a precursor to acting out with real children, 
where “[m]any pedophiles acknowledge that exposure to child abuse fuels their sexual fantasies 
and plays an important part in leading them to commit hands-on sexual offenses against 
children.”59  Evidence suggests that it is only a small leap from viewing child pornography to 
molesting children, and “[i]n light of the documented link between . . . [the two,] each child 
pornography case should be viewed as a red flag to the possibility of actual child molestation.”60 
 Although no one can agree on the exact percentage of individuals that view child 
pornography and also sexually molest children, it seems that almost everyone agrees that some 
correlation does in fact exist.  This type of correlation falls under the category of indirect harm, a 
category of harm that the government has a compelling interest in preventing, as found by the 
Court in Ferber and again in Osborne v. Ohio.
61
  However, although the Court in Ferber 
discusses both direct and indirect harms caused by the production and distribution of child 
pornography, it acted inconsistently when discussing the difference between actual and virtual 
child pornography.  “Unfortunately, the Court did not consistently hold to its restriction against 
virtual child pornography.  Instead it seemed to create a loophole through which virtual child 
pornography could escape the prohibition.”62  While at one point, the Court acknowledges the 
importance of preventing children from both direct and indirect harm, at another point the Court 
basically says that virtual child pornography could be utilized as a legal alternative to actual 
                                                 
58
 See Kim, supra note 39 (Grooming is the gradual process by which child molesters build trust with the child to 
transition from a nonsexual relationship to a sexual relationship.  This is accomplished by seeking out, befriending, 
and manipulating a target, and seducing the child with attention, affection and gifts.). 
59
 John Carr, Child Abuse, Child Pornography and the Internet: Executive Summary (NCH 2004). 
60
 Kim, supra note 39. 
61
 In Osborne, the Court found that “pedophiles use child pornography to seduce . . . children into sexual activity.” 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
62
 Liu, supra note 13, at 10. 
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child pornography, even though virtual child pornography causes the same indirect harms to 
children as its real-life counterparts.
63
  “[T]he Supreme Court closed the front door to keep 
virtual pornography out; but at the same time, it opened the back door to let it in.”64  In order to 
combat this loophole created by the Supreme Court in Ferber, Congress passed the Child 
Pornography Protection Act (CPPA) of 1996. 
III. THE CPPA AND RELATED CASES 
A. The CPPA 
 For the last several decades, “Congress has been trying to eliminate the scourge of child 
pornography.  Each time Congress passes a law, child pornographers find a way around the law’s 
prohibitions.  This cycle recently repeated itself and prompted Congress to enact the CPPA.”65  
In enacting the CPPA, Congress attempted “to close loopholes in our Federal child pornography 
laws caused by advances in our computer technology,”66 by banning visual depictions that 
“appear[ ] to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” or that are “advertised, 
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that 
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”67  
The CPPA covered actual child pornography, morphed child pornography, child pornography 
made by using youthful-looking adults, and wholly computer-generated virtual child 
pornography.  In enacting the CPPA, Congress included thirteen detailed legislative findings that 
gave its explanation for why it was imperative that virtual child pornography be prohibited.
68
  
Congress found it to be a compelling governmental interest to protect children from direct harm, 
                                                 
63
 See Liu, supra note 13, at 10 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763). “[I]f it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a 
person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.  Simulation outside of the prohibition 
of the statute could provide another alternative.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. 
64
 Liu, supra note 13, at 10. 
65
 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
66
 Liu, supra note 13, at 15 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-338, at 28 (2006) (Additional Views of Senator Biden)). 
67
 Reno, 198 F.3d at 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2256(8)(B), (d) (West Supp. 1999)). 
68
 See id. 
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such as found in actual child pornography in Ferber, as well as indirect harm produced by actual 
or virtual child pornography. 
B. The Constitutionality of the CPPA 
1. Circuit Court Decisions 
 After Congress passed the CPPA, four Federal Circuit Courts upheld the constitutionality 
of it.  However, the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno held it to be 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 
 In 1999, the First Circuit in United States v. Hilton, applied strict scrutiny in reviewing 
the CPPA, and held that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children from 
both direct and indirect harm.
69
  The Court in Hilton observed that “the legislative record . . . 
[makes it] plain that the [CPPA] was intended to target only a narrow class of images–visual 
depictions ‘which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers’”70 from actual child 
pornography.  The Court found that virtual child pornography, similar to actual child 
pornography, had little, if any social value, yet “[t]he government’s interest in addressing these 
forms of child pornography is no less powerful than in instances where an actual child is actually 
used and abused during the production process.”71  The Court in Hilton found that although there 
might be some illegitimate applications of the CPPA, the “existence of a few possibly 
impermissible applications of the Act does not warrant its condemnation . . . [and w]hatever 
overbreadth may exist at the edges are more appropriately cured through a more precise case-by-
case evaluations of the facts in a given case.”72  The Court stressed the fact that there was an 
affirmative defense available in scenarios where the CPPA might be impermissibly applied, and 
                                                 
69
 See Liu, supra note 13, at 16. 
70
 United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 72 (1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, pt. 1, p. 7 (1996)). 
71
 Id. at 73. 
72
 Liu, supra note 13, at 17. 
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therefore, it was not substantially overbroad.
73
  It also held that the CPPA was not 
unconstitutionally vague, finding that the “appears to be” standard was not purely subjective but 
instead was an objective standard: “[a] jury must decide, based on the totality of the 
circumstances whether an unsuspecting viewer would consider the depiction to be an actual 
individual under the age of eighteen engaging in sexual activity.”74  Furthermore, the Court 
found an additional safeguard against arbitrary prosecutions, in that “[t]he element of scienter . . . 
must be satisfied by the prosecution before a valid conviction may be obtained – for instance, the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual ‘knowingly’ possessed the 
child pornography,”75 and this scienter requirement “extends to both the sexually explicit nature 
of the material and the to the age of the performers.”76  As such, the Court came to the 
conclusion that “the statute’s provisions ‘suitably limit’ the reach of the Act so that a person of 
ordinary intelligence can easily discern likely unlawful conduct and conform his or her conduct 
appropriately.”77 
 That same year the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Acheson also upheld the CPPA.  
It found that “the CPPA’s overbreadth is minimal when viewed in light of its plainly legitimate 
sweep,” and that the ‘appears to be’ language does not impermissibly expand “the scope of the 
CPPA to the point where it captures so much constitutionally protected conduct as to render the 
statute invalid.”78  The Court found that the “appears to be” language only targeted images that 
were “virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs of 
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actual children engaging in explicitly sexual conduct,”79 and found that the suggestion in Ferber 
(that youthful-looking adults or simulations could be used as a legal alternative) should not be 
given much weight because the Ferber Court had also found virtual child pornography to be of 
“exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,” value and as such was unlikely to “constitute an 
important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work.”80  The 
Court agreed with the court in Hilton, that any potential overbreadth that may exist could be 
“cured through case-by-case analysis.”81  The Court also agreed with the court in Hilton that the 
scienter requirement protected against unscrupulous enforcement, in that “[i[f the government 
could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the charged person ‘knowingly receives or 
distributes’ or ‘knowingly possesses’ materials prohibited by the Act, then the statute did not 
apply,”82 and concluded “that the CPPA passed the void-for-vagueness test.”83 
 The following year, in United States v. Mento, the Fourth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to 
the CPPA and held that there was a compelling governmental interest in protecting children from 
sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography
84
, and recognized the fact that virtual child 
pornography produced “the same negative effects on minors” as actual child pornography.85  The 
Court agreed with both the Hilton and Acheson courts in that the Act was not constitutionally 
overbroad, for the “appears to be” language “prohibited only those images that were virtually 
indistinguishable from real child pornography,”86 and did “not outlaw items such as drawings, 
cartoons, or paintings.”87  The Court noted that when virtual child pornography “cannot be easily 
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distinguished from the real thing . . . [it does] not deserve the protections of the First 
Amendment, because ‘like sexually explicit material produced with actual children, there is little, 
if any social value in this type of expression.”88  The Court agreed with both the Hilton and 
Acheson courts and found that the CPPA was neither overbroad nor void for vagueness. 
 The year after Mento was decided, the CPPA was once again brought up in United States 
v. Fox.  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the three courts above and found the Act to be neither 
overbroad nor void for vagueness.  The Court referred to both Ferber and Osborne and held that 
regulation of virtual child pornography was justified due to its indirect harm to children.
89
  The 
Court noted that the Osborne court had discussed not only the direct harm caused to minors who 
are used as subjects in child pornography, but also the indirect harm posed to future children 
when such pornography is used to seduce or coerce them into sexual activity, and that “[i]t 
makes no difference to the children coerced by such materials, or to the adult who employs them 
to lure children into sexual activity, whether the subjects depicted are actual children or 
computer simulations of children.”90  Virtual child pornography fuels the child pornography 
market, and “the Ferber court expressly endorsed the destruction of . . . [this] market as a 
justification of banning sexually explicit images of children.”91 
 In the same year that Hilton and Achelson was decided, the Ninth Circuit split with the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits on the constitutionality of the CPPA in Free Speech 
Coalition v. Reno.
92
  Like the other courts, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny
93
, but found 
the Act to be unconstitutional on three grounds. The Court found that the government did not 
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have a compelling interest in banning virtual child pornography
94
, and held the Act to be 
unconstitutionally overbroad
95
 and unconstitutionally vague
96
.  Unlike the other four Circuit 
courts, the Court in Reno interpreted Ferber as legitimizing only one kind of compelling 
government interest – the direct harm caused to children who are subjects of child 
pornography.
97
  The Court in Reno did not recognize the fact that virtual child pornography 
could cause indirect harm to future children who are seduced by pedophiles, instead finding that 
“factual studies that established the link between computer-generated child pornography and the 
subsequent sexual abuse of children do not yet exist.”98  The Ninth Circuit felt that without 
containing visual images of actual children, there was no compelling governmental interest in 
regulating virtual child pornography
99
 and thus, found the CPPA to be invalid on its face. 
C. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
After the Reno court found the CPPA to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and decided Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition in 2002.  The Supreme Court sided with 
the Ninth Circuit and found the CPPA to be unconstitutional.
100
  In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court 
recognized the fact that “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act 
repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people.”101  Because of this, Congress is allowed to 
pass valid laws to protect children from abuse; however, “the prospect of crime . . . by itself does 
not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”102  Although the freedom of speech is one of our 
most fundamental rights, it does have its limits; certain categories such as defamation, 
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incitement, obscenity, and actual pornography are not embraced.
103
  The Court found that none 
of those categories included the speech that was prohibited by the CPPA, and held that the CPPA 
goes beyond both Ferber and Miller.  “The CPPA . . . extends to images that appear to depict a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit activity without regard to the Miller requirements,”104 and 
“applies to a picture in a psychology manual, as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual 
abuse.”105  The Court said that the CPPA prohibited speech without regard to its literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.
106
 
The Court held that under the CPPA’s literal terms, works such as Shakespeare’s Romeo 
and Juliet would fall within the statute’s prohibitions.107  Academy Award winning movies such 
as Traffic and American Beauty “explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute’s 
prohibitions,” regardless of whether or not they violate the CPPA.108  It is the Court’s view that if 
any of the hundreds of films or other literary works that explore these subjects “contain even a 
single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the 
film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work’s redeeming value.”  
According to the Court, this is not consistent with the First Amendment rule that “[t]he artistic 
merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene,” and because of that, 
“[t]he CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity . . . .  [I]t lacks the required link between its 
prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of obscenity.”109 
The Government tried to address this deficiency by arguing that the only speech that the 
CPPA prohibited was speech that was “virtually indistinguishable” from child pornography, 
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which could be banned “without regard to whether it depicts works of value.”110  However, the 
Court found that the State had an interest in stamping out images without regard to any judgment 
about its content only in circumstances where the images were themselves the product of child 
abuse, as in Ferber.
111
  The statute in Ferber targeted the production of the work, not the work’s 
contents.  “The fact that a work contained serious literary, artistic, or other value did not excuse 
the harm it caused to its child participants.”112  In Ferber, the prohibited speech had a “proximate 
link” to the crime from which it came.113 
The Court in Ashcroft discussed Osborne and recognized that Osborne had noted “the 
State’s interest in preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the solicitation of 
minors.”114  However the Court felt that Osborne had “anchored its holding in the concern for 
the participants, those whom it called the ‘victims of child pornography,’” and that absent direct 
harm, indirect harm alone would not suffice.
115
  The CPPA prohibited speech that created no 
victim in its production and recorded no crime, unlike the speech in Ferber which was the record 
of child sexual abuse.
116
  The Court found that virtual child pornography was not “intrinsically 
related” to the sexual abuse of children, and that while images can lead to instances of actual 
child abuse, “the causal link is contingent and indirect.”117  Unlike in Ferber, where the harm 
follows from the speech, here it “depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent 
criminal acts.”118 
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The Government found those indirect harms to be sufficient, citing Ferber’s 
acknowledgement that child pornography can rarely be valuable speech, but the Court found two 
flaws in that argument.
119
  The first flaw was that the Ferber court decided the way it did based 
on how the child pornography was made, not on the message that it communicated, something 
the Court stresses several times throughout its holding.
120
  “The case reaffirmed that where the 
speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection 
of the First Amendment.”121  Secondly, Ferber recognized that some works in the category of 
child pornography might have significant value, and it relied on virtual images as an “alternative 
and permissible means of expression.”122  It not only made the distinction between actual and 
virtual child pornography, but it relied on it as a reason for its holding, and as such it “provides 
no support for a statute that eliminates the distinction and makes the alternative mode criminal as 
well.”123 
The Supreme Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with both Miller and Ferber, and 
found no weight in the Government’s other justifications.  The Government argued four other 
reasons for why the CPPA was necessary.  First, pedophiles can use virtual child pornography to 
seduce children.
124
  However, the Court found this concern no different than other innocent 
things that could be used for immoral purposes, such as cartoons, video games, and candy.
125
  
The Court said the government could of course punish these pedophiles for providing unsuitable 
materials to children, but that the Government “cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it 
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may fall into the hands of children.”126  In the case of using virtual child pornography to seduce 
children, the evil is dependent upon the actor’s unlawful conduct, conduct “defined as criminal 
quite apart from any link to the speech in question.”127  The Court found that the CPPA went 
well beyond the interest in prohibiting illegal conduct “by restricting the speech available to law-
abiding adults.”128 
Secondly, the Government contended that virtual child pornography “whets the appetites 
of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct,”129 a sentiment that Congress 
had included in its Congressional findings following the passage of the CPPA.  But the Court 
rejected that argument and held that the Government could not “constitutionally premise 
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”130  “The mere tendency 
of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”131  In the Court’s 
view, the Government did not show that the speech in question incited or produced imminent 
lawless action, as required under Brandenburg v. Ohio
132
, and as such the Government could not 
“prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some 
indefinite future time.’”133 
For its third justification, the Government argued that virtual child pornography needed 
to be prohibited in order to help eliminate the market for pornography produced using real 
children.
134
  The Government found that virtual images are indistinguishable from real ones, and 
as such could be traded with pedophiles for actual child pornography, further fueling the market 
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for child pornography.  However, the Court found this to be implausible.  Instead, it felt that “[i]f 
virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven 
from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes [and f]ew pornographers would risk 
prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.”135  Unlike 
Ferber, where the creation of the speech was itself the crime of child abuse, here the Court said 
there was no underlying crime at all, and as a result the Government’s market deterrence theory 
did not justify this statute.
136
 
Finally, the Government argued that the “possibility of producing images by using 
computer imaging makes it very difficult for it to prosecute those who produce pornography by 
using real children.”137  Experts can have a difficult time determining whether the pictures were 
produced using actual children or by using computer imaging, and so the Government argued 
that both kinds of images needed to be prohibited.
138
  Rather than interpreting the CPPA as a 
measure suppressing speech, the Government wanted the Court to read the CPPA as a law that 
shifts the burden to the accused to prove the speech is not unlawful, and relied on an affirmative 
defense under the statute.
139
  This affirmative defense “allows a defendant to avoid conviction 
for nonposession offenses by showing that the materials were produced using only adults and 
were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the impression that they depicted real 
children.”140  The Court likened the Government’s final argument to essentially an argument that 
says protected speech should be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech.
141
  This, the Court 
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says, turns the First Amendment upside down.
142
  Protected speech does not lose First 
Amendment protection simply because it resembles unprotected speech; instead the opposite is 
true.  “[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is 
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted,”143 and 
consequently the Government is prohibited “from banning unprotected speech if a substantial 
amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.”144  The Court also found the 
affirmative defense to be incomplete and insufficient, leaving unprotected “a substantial amount 
of speech not tied to the Government’s interest in distinguishing images produced using real 
children from virtual ones.”145 
The Supreme Court found that the CPPA covered materials beyond the recognized 
categories in Ferber and Miller, and that it abridged the freedom to engage in a substantial 
amount of lawful speech.
146
  As a result, it held that the CPPA was overbroad and 
unconstitutional.
147
 
IV. THE COURT IN ASHCROFT GOT IT WRONG 
 In holding that the CPPA was unconstitutional, the Court in Ashcroft got it wrong for 
several reasons.  In 1995, Congress opined that apparent child pornography was equally as 
dangerous as real child pornography, yet technology back then was not even a fraction of what it 
is today.  Justice Thomas conceded in his concurring opinion in Ashcroft, that “technology may 
evolve to the point where it becomes impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws 
because the Government cannot prove that certain pornographic images are of real children.”148  
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Thomas was of the opinion that if advances in technology thwarted prosecution of “unlawful 
speech,” then “the Government may well have a compelling interest in barring or otherwise 
regulating some narrow category of ‘lawful speech’ in order to enforce effectively laws against 
pornography made through the abuse of real children.’”149  This future time period that Justice 
Thomas speaks of is upon us now.  It has been nine years since the Court decided Ashcroft, and 
in that time technology has improved tenfold.  At the time of Ashcroft’s decision, Congress had 
evidence demonstrating “that technology already exists to disguise depictions of real children to 
make them unidentifiable and to make depictions of real children appear computer-generated.  
The technology will soon exist, if it does not already, to computer generate realistic images of 
children.”150  Almost a decade ago, Congress correctly predicted that technology would soon 
exist that was capable of creating life-like and realistic images of children.  One need not look 
any further than Hollywood and the video game industry to see how far our CGI technology has 
come. 
The Court in Ashcroft disregarded most of the Congressional findings that were filed with 
the CPPA.  The Court instead decided that if virtual pornography was as indistinguishable from 
actual pornography as Congress said it was, then no pornographer would ever risk prosecution 
by abusing real children when creating virtual ones would suffice.  But much as the Court felt 
about the Government’s market deterrence theory, it is in fact the Court’s judgment that is highly 
implausible.  For one, it relies on a “false assumption of pragmatic rationality.  The opinion 
assumes that child pornographers are pragmatically rational.”151  But this is a false assumption, 
for no pragmatically rational person would use or create child pornography in the first place.  
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The Court was mistaken as to the reasons and motivations behind producing actual child 
pornography. 
Child pornography results from the abuse of real children by sex offenders; the 
production of child pornography is a byproduct of, and not the primary reason 
for, the sexual abuse of children.  There is no evidence that the future 
development of easy and inexpensive means of computer generating realistic 
images of children would stop or even reduce the sexual abuse of real children or 
the practice of visually recording that abuse.
152
 
 
The Ashcroft Court essentially decided that if a child pornographer could choose between 
abusing a child and digitally creating a virtual one, he would almost always choose the latter.  “If 
virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography . . . few pornographers would risk 
prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.”153  But 
this is a baseless assumption.  “[M]any experts on child molesters explain that these individuals 
derive sexual gratification from the pain inflicted on actual children, and the recording of it.  
These producers of child pornography would not be interested in virtual pornography.”154  Child 
pornographers do not abuse children for the primary goal of making child pornography.  Instead, 
abusing children is an activity that child molesters like to take part in.  Recording that abuse is 
something else that they like to do.  Being given an alternative means of creating child 
pornography would not make a child molester stop abusing children.  This argument that the 
Supreme Court puts forth is akin to saying the following: a boy likes to skateboard with his 
friends; he enjoys filming himself perform skateboard tricks; he then likes to go on the computer 
and trade his videos with other skateboarders to view their videos and enjoy.  If at some point 
technology came around where it was easy and efficient to produce those same skateboarding 
videos, but without actually having to skateboard, it is the Court’s opinion that that boy, and 
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others like him, would almost always choose that alternative method.  But the Court is missing 
the main point: the boy likes to skateboard, so even if he was given another means of producing a 
skateboarding video, he still is going to skateboard.  The same logic follows with child 
molesters.  Child molesters have a propensity to molest children, and they derive pleasure from 
recording that abuse, so even if they are given another means of producing videos of children 
being sexually molested, they are still going to want to molest children. 
Another reason for why Ashcroft was incorrectly decided was that the Court’s reasoning 
was inconsistent with Osborne and Ferber because the Court in Ashcroft changed its view on 
indirect harm.  In Osborne, the Court found that pedophiles will sometimes use child 
pornography to help seduce other children into sexual activity.  Therefore it recognized the fact 
that there were two types of harms stemming from child pornography: direct and indirect.  The 
Osborne Court was aware that child pornography not only caused direct harm to the children 
who were used as subjects in the pornographic material, but also caused indirect harm to other 
children.  It “indicated that protecting children who are not actually pictured in the pornographic 
image is a legitimate and compelling state interest.”155  The Court in Ferber admitted to there 
being an “intrinsic relationship” between child pornography and indirect harm to children, and 
held that “[t]he distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.”156  Yet in Ashcroft, the Court changed its 
stance and found that indirect harm caused to children did not suffice as a compelling state 
interest for banning virtual child pornography. 
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 Virtual child pornography is by definition virtually indistinguishable from actual child 
pornography.  Therefore, the CPPA would not cover materials such as Romeo and Juliet, or 
Traffic, or American Beauty, or everyday artistic expressions like paintings, drawings, and 
sculptures that depict youthful looking subjects in a sexual manner, something that the majority 
in Ashcroft seems to think is very probable.  In his dissent in Reno, Judge Ferguson felt that it 
was important to consider the findings that Congress had filed with the CPPA.  In them, 
“Congress repeatedly stated that the law is targeted at visual depictions that are ‘virtually 
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual 
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct’”157 and that the language in the statute covers 
“the same type of photographic images already prohibited, but which do[ ] not require the use of 
an actual minor.”158  As the Court in Hilton said, “drawings, cartoons, sculptures, and paintings 
depicting youthful persons in sexually explicit poses plainly lie beyond the Act [because b]y 
definition they would not be ‘virtually indistinguishable’ from an image of an actual minor.”159  
The CPPA simply extends the prohibitions that already exist on actual child pornography to a 
narrow class of computer-generated images that could easily be mistaken as real children, and 
therefore contrary to what the Court in Ashcroft believes, the “CPPA . . . does not pose a threat to 
the vast majority of every day artistic expression, even to speech involving sexual themes.”160  
Further, the chill felt by the majority, that “few legitimate movie producers . . . would risk 
distributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this law,” was never actually felt by those 
who make movies.
161
  Movies such as Traffic and American Beauty won their Academy Awards 
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in 2001 and 2000, respectively; yet, the CPPA had been on the books, and had been enforced, 
since 1996.
162
  Clearly, the CPPA did not discourage or prevent those movie producers from 
making their movies.  
 Because virtual child pornography is virtually indistinguishable from actual child 
pornography, it follows then that it causes the same indirect harm to children as actual child 
pornography does.  “Thus, if the prevention of child pornography’s indirect harm suffices to be a 
compelling government interest [something the Court recognized in both Ferber and Osborne], 
the prevention of the indirect harm caused by virtual child pornography also suffices.”163  
However, to reconcile the difference in its opinions, the Ashcroft Court denied that it had ever 
held indirect harm to be a compelling interest in Ferber, consequentially denying that the 
protection of children from virtual child pornography is a compelling interest.
164
  “In order to 
serve its purpose of invalidating the CPPA, the Court changed its position from Ferber and 
Osborne to Ashcroft without admitting the change.”165 
The Court in Ashcroft failed to see the similarities between virtual and actual child 
pornography and the indirect harm it can cause.  Unfortunately it did not give enough weight to 
the dangers that virtual child pornography can pose.  First of all, viewing child pornography 
stimulates pedophiles and causes them to go out looking for actual child victims.  Pedophiles 
view the child pornography and then want to commit similar acts on real children.  Secondly, 
pedophiles often use the child pornography to seduce those other children into sexual activity.  
This is something that Congress stressed heavily in its findings accompanying the CPPA, in part 
relying on what the Court said in Osborne.  When a child views a video of a similarly-aged child 
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engaging in sexual activity with an adult, the child sees this activity as being acceptable and thus 
is more willing to engage in sexual acts with the pedophile.  These pedophiles are using this 
child pornography in order to make the child feel comfortable in turning their relationship into a 
sexual one.  What the Court in Ashcroft failed to understand is that from the perspective of the 
child, he could care less whether the image is of a real or virtual person.  To the child, it makes 
no difference.  That is not to say that if a pedophile was using a cartoon such as Spongebob 
Squarepants to seduce a child, that Spongebob should now be prohibited.  But Congress found 
that “when child pornography is ‘used as a means of seducing or breaking down a child’s 
inhibitions,’ the images are equally effective regardless of whether they are real photographs or 
computer-generated pictures that are ‘virtually indistinguishable.’”166  Bruce Taylor, Chief 
Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and Families, stated during the Hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1995 that “real and apparent [child pornography] . . . 
are equally dangerous because both have . . . the same seductive effect on a child victim.”167  The 
children that are being molested by pedophiles can range anywhere from the age of one to a pre-
pubescent child.  Obviously, if a pedophile were to victimize a one-year old, he would not need 
child pornography to seduce that child.  But that does not necessarily make the dangers of child 
pornography fall by the wayside, for the fact remains that the child pornography is still making 
that child molester want to go out and seek future victims in the first place.  
 As virtual child pornography becomes more and more life-like, it can be used to promote 
the market for child pornography, the destruction of which is something that the Court 
specifically recognized as a legitimate interest in Osborne and Ferber.  Congress, in enacting the 
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CPPA, stated that the statute would “encourage people to destroy all forms of child pornography, 
thereby reducing the market for the material.”168  Contrary to what the Court believes in 
Ashcroft, “persons who trade and sell images that are indistinguishable from those of actual 
children engaged in sexual activity ‘keep the market for child pornography thriving.’”169  
Pictures that look like children engaging in sexual activities can be exchanged for actual child 
pornography, and thus, by “limiting the production and distribution of images that appear to be 
of children having sex, the CPPA helps rid the market of all child pornography.”170  It is 
“undoubtedly true” that “somewhere in this chain of computer-generated production there are 
going to be real children . . . involved.”171 
 The majority in Ashcroft also failed to address Congress’ concern that “computer-
imaging technology is making it increasingly difficult in criminal cases for the government ‘to 
meet its burden of proving that a pornographic image is of a real child.’”172 
In the absence of congressional action, the difficulties in enforcing the child 
pornography laws will continue to grow increasingly worse.  The mere prospect 
that the technology exists to create composite of computer-generated depictions 
that are indistinguishable from depictions of real children will allow defendants 
who possess images of real children to escape prosecution; for it threatens to 
create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer images even when a real 
child was abused.  This threatens to render child pornography laws that protect 
real children unenforceable.  Moreover, imposing an additional requirement that 
the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the 
image was in fact a real child–as some courts have done–threatens to result in the 
de facto legalization of the possession, receipt, and distribution of child 
pornography for all except the original producers of the material.
173
 
 
                                                 
168
 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104
th
 Cong., 2d 
Sess. at 12 (1996) (statement of Bruce Taylor, Chief Counsel for the National Law Center for Children and 
Families). 
169
 Id. at 91. 
170
 Reno, 198 F.3d at 1099 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
171
 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104
th
 Cong., 2d 
Sess. at 122 (1996) (testimony of Professor Frederick Schauer, Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). 
172
 Reno, 198 F.3d at 1100 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing S.Rep. No. 104-358, at 20). 
173
 Congressional Finding (13), Pub. L. 108-21, notes following 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251. 
31 
 
In fact, in one case, United States v. Kimbrough, the defendant relied on advances in computer 
technology in arguing that the government had failed to meet its “burden that each item of the 
alleged child pornography did, in fact, depict an actual minor rather than an adult made to look 
like one.”174  Although no defendant at the time of Ashcroft had ever successfully employed this 
argument, “given the rapid pace of advances in computer-graphics technology, the Government’s 
concern is reasonable.”175  Even in 2002, Justice O’Connor gave credence to the fact that 
“[c]omputer-generated images lodged with the Court by amici curiae National Law Center for 
Children and Families et al. bear a remarkable likeness to actual human beings.”176  The 
Government’s concern becomes far more reasonable, given that computer-graphics technology 
has advanced exponentially since Ashcroft was decided.  As computer imaging software 
progresses and defendants become able to use that in order to raise a “built-in reasonable doubt 
argument in every child exploitation/pornography prosecution,” Congress felt it was necessary to 
close this loophole using the CPPA.  The majority in Ashcroft should have taken this into 
consideration.
177
 
 The Ashcroft Court also failed to meet the contention that child pornography, whether 
real or virtual, has little or no social value.  There is no logical reason to treat virtual child 
pornography differently than real child pornography.  Virtual child pornography is not more 
valued speech.  “Both real and virtual child pornography contain visual depictions of children 
engaging in sexually explicit activity.  The only difference is that real child pornography uses 
actual children in its production, whereas virtual child pornography does not.”178  Although this 
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distinction is of some importance, it “does not somehow transfer virtual child pornography into 
meaningful speech.”179 
[T]he effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on a child molester or 
pedophile using that material to stimulate or whet his own sexual appetite, or on a 
child where the material is being used as a means of seducing or breaking down 
the child’s inhibitions to sexual abuse or exploitation, is the same whether the 
child pornography . . . [is real child pornography, or virtual child pornography 
that is] virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from photographic 
images of actual children.
180
 
 
Because the danger to the molested child is just as great when the child pornographer uses virtual 
child pornography as when the material used consists of actual children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct, “[v]irtual child pornography, like its counterpart real child pornography, is of 
‘slight social value’ and constitutes ‘no essential part of the exposition of ideas.’”181  Thus, the 
Ashcroft Court should never have accorded virtual child pornography the full protection of the 
First Amendment.  Instead, it should have realized that “Congress’ interests in destroying the 
child pornography market and in preventing the seduction of minors outweigh virtual child 
pornography’s exceedingly modest social value.”182  “Since the balance of competing interests 
tips in favor of the government,”183 virtual child pornography, like real child pornography, 
should be as a class of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment. 
 The Supreme Court in Ashcroft emphasized the fact that the speech prohibited by the 
CPPA created no victim in its production and recorded no crime, and that the causal link 
between virtual child pornography and the sexual abuse of children was contingent and indirect, 
unlike the speech in Ferber that had a proximate link to the crime from which it came.
184
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However, this causal link theory is “inadequate and unsupported by the Court’s prior cases.”185  
It is inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence to restrict speech only if it records a crime.  
As the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire held, fighting words could be regulated, “not 
because they ‘record’ or have ‘caused’ an independent crime, but because doing so is necessary 
to prevent a crime.”186  If we were to adopt the Court’s causal link theory, then fighting words 
would never be regulated.  While discussing actual causal link, the Court failed to recognize the 
second type of causal link: potential.  “Potential causal link stems from Justice Holmes’ clear and 
present danger test.”187  It serves a preventative purpose, in that the speech can be regulated to 
prevent the potential crime associated with that speech from happening.  Justice O’Connor 
recognized this potential causal link in her dissent, saying that “this Court’s cases do not require 
Congress to wait for harm to occur before it can legislate against it.”188  In Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court said that “[a] fundamental principle of legislation is that Congress 
is under no obligation to wait until the entire harm occurs but may act to prevent it.”189  
Consequently, the fact that virtual child pornography does not record a crime or create a victim 
does not imply that there is no causal link between virtual child pornography and the sexual 
abuse of children.  The CPPA helps prevent future crimes from occurring, and the Court in 
Ashcroft should have given deference to Congress in determining that. 
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V. USING BRANDENBURG V. OHIO AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF COMBATING VIRTUAL 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Traditionally, Courts have upheld laws banning child pornography because real children 
were used in its production.  Virtual child pornography upsets this traditional rationale because 
no actual child actors are used in its creation.  However, there is an alternative, and largely 
unexplored, means of combating digital child pornography.  A “more in-depth analysis shows 
how virtual child pornography should still lack First Amendment protection under the ‘advocacy 
of illegal conduct’ exception to free speech, [in that] . . . it incites imminent lawless action, 
specifically whetting the appetites of pedophiles to seduce and harm real children.”190 
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the defendant invited a news reporter to tape, and later replay on 
the evening news, portions of a KKK rally that was filled with hateful remarks towards black 
people and Jewish people.
191
  The Court in that case said that his speech was nothing more than a 
mere advocacy of illegal conduct.  The Court held that “where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action,”192 
the speech will not be protected by the First Amendment.  There is a strong argument to be made 
that the CPPA’s ban of digital child pornography is constitutional under the Brandenburg 
analysis. 
Although never specifically mentioned by the Brandenburg Court, the “audience” of the 
concerned speech has an effect on whether the speech is likely to incite imminent lawless action.  
There is an argument to be made that it’s possible the Court did not think the defendant’s hateful 
comments would incite lawless action on the part of the general public because there was a good 
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chance that most of the television viewers did not share the same views and feelings of hatred as 
the KKK leaders, and thus would not be incited to go out and harm black people and Jewish 
people.  Because the views expressed in the video were so radical, it was unlikely that it would 
have any effect of “encouraging violence similar to that encouraged in the video, especially 
among the general public.”193 
In looking at the CPPA under the Brandenburg analysis, it becomes helpful to analogize 
the facts of Brandenburg to the ban on digital child pornography.  Unlike in Brandenburg, where 
the “audience” was the general public, imagine if instead the “audience” was only members of 
the KKK.  Because the “audience” would share the same radical views and feelings of hatred as 
the KKK leaders in the video, it is more likely that they would have been incited to go out and 
harm black people and Jewish people.  If that were the case, the Court most likely would have 
found the speech in Brandenburg to be beyond just “mere advocacy of illegal conduct,” and 
instead inciting imminent lawless action.  Analogizing that to the CPPA’s ban on digital child 
pornography, the “audience” in question here is very similar to the “audience” in the 
hypothetical above. 
In the case of digital child pornography, the “audience” is likely just made up of 
pedophiles or other sexual abusers who know how to find child pornography on 
the Web.  Because the “audience” is made up specifically of the type of people 
who are likely to take part in the crime depicted in the digital photographs, there 
seems to be a much greater likelihood of “inciting imminent lawless action” than 
if those photographs were shown to the general public over the nightly news like 
in Brandenburg.
194
 
 
Furthermore, where the video footage in Brandenburg only encouraged lawless action, the 
material banned by the CPPA actually depicts lawless action taking place.  So imagine then back 
to our hypothetical above, if the video that was sent around to KKK members did not contain a 
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speech by the KKK leaders encouraging lawless action, but instead showed digitally created 
images of them killing or torturing blacks and Jews.  Now imagine this resulted in the further 
commission of those same digitally depicted acts perpetrated against real blacks and Jews.  
“Under this scenario, it seems likely that the Court in Brandenburg would have considered the 
advocacy of illegal conduct much more ‘imminent,’ such that the digital photographs depicting 
violence toward blacks and Jews would not be protected by the First Amendment.”195  If the 
speech that is banned by the CPPA was changed instead to look like the facts in Brandenburg, it 
would be as such: pedophiles create, and distribute to the general public, a video of a speech 
encouraging members of the public to go out and sexually molest children.  Obviously, because a 
majority of the population would not share in these feelings, and thus would not be incited to go 
out and actually molest children, the Court would find that to be merely advocating illegal 
conduct, and therefore constitutional under the First Amendment, like the speech in 
Brandenburg.  However, that is not the type of speech banned by the CPPA.  It bans digitally 
created material that portrays actual lawless action.  Further, this material is being distributed 
solely to an “audience” who shares the same radical feelings as the pedophiles in the videos.  
Therefore, they are much more likely to be incited to go out and take part in the same acts 
portrayed in the films.  “[D]ue to the evidence suggesting that pedophiles use digital photographs 
to ‘whet their appetites,’ there seems to be a strong argument that the CPPA’s ban on digital 
child pornography should withstand First Amendment scrutiny.”196 
 Virtual child pornography incites several types of lawless action.  These include 
downloading, distributing, and sharing files of actual child pornography, and sexually molesting 
actual children.   As discussed earlier, virtual child pornography can be used to whet the appetite 
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of pedophiles and fuel the market for actual child pornography.  The Court in Osborne 
recognized that child pornography was used by pedophiles to “seduce other children into 
activity” by breaking down their inhibitions.197  “Congress found that child pornography can 
have that effect, regardless of whether the pornography takes the form of computer-generated 
images or photographs of real children.”198  “Clearly, one of the primary uses of child 
pornography, and, thus virtual child pornography, is for the systematic desensitization, as part of 
an insidious process, to induce children to engage in the acts depicted.”199  Congress also heard 
evidence that often times pedophiles will exchange images of digitally created child pornography 
for pictures of real children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
200
  The Court in Hilton found, 
as discussed above, that distributing virtual child pornography would encourage the production 
of real child pornography, and believed that the main purpose of the CPPA was to deprive child 
abusers of a “criminal tool” frequently used to facilitate the sexual abuse of children.201 
 In sum, as opposed to other forms of media that depict lawless action, but are distributed 
to the general public, virtual child pornography is a depiction and encouragement of lawless 
action that is presented to and sought out by a very narrow, specific audience that is likely to be 
stimulated to react to it.
202
  The way pedophiles use digital child pornography is “likely to 
incite”203 them to seduce and harm children.  “Specifically, evidence that digital child 
pornography ‘whets the appetite’ of pedophiles supports the conclusion that such images ‘incite 
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imminent lawless action,’ causing pedophiles to be stimulated into action, resulting in harm to 
real children.”204 
VI. THE FUTURE OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE PROTECT ACT OF 2003 
A. The PROTECT Act of 2003 
 In response the Supreme Court’s ruling that the CPPA was unconstitutional, many bills 
were drafted by the Senate and House to address the issue.  On April 10, 2003 the Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act (herein 
referred to as the Act) was passed by Congress and was signed by the president on April 30, 
2003.
205
  The purpose of the Act was to further fight against virtual child pornography, while 
addressing the deficiencies that the Court said existed in the CPPA.   
 One of the problems that the Ashcroft Court found with the CPPA was that the 
affirmative defense provided for in § 2252A(c) – that the burden would shift to the defendant to 
prove that the alleged child pornography was produced using an adult, and therefore that his 
speech was not unlawful – was incomplete and insufficient on its own terms, in that it allowed 
“persons to be convicted in some instances where they can prove children were not exploited in 
the production [i.e., computer generated virtual minors].”206  The Act amended this section by 
expanding the defense to include computer-generated child pornography.  This affirmative 
defense, however, still cannot be asserted with respect to “morphed” child pornography, as the 
minor in those materials are real, not virtual.  The statute defines “morphed” child pornography 
as visual depictions that have “been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable 
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minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”207  In other words, morphed child pornography 
occurs when an innocent image of a real child is altered to depict something sexually explicit.  
This is not virtual child pornography because “the minor is not virtual – only the pose is.”208  A 
defendant would not be able to allege here that an adult was used in the image’s production or 
that the image was computer generated.  Therefore, the affirmative defense cannot be asserted 
with regard to “morphed” child pornography. 
 The Act also made changes to § 2256(8)(B), one of the two sections that the Ashcroft 
Court had found unconstitutionally overbroad.  It replaced the language in § 2256(8)(B) from “is, 
or appears to be of a minor” to “is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor.”  The Act 
defined “indistinguishable” in subsection (11) as such: “[indistinguishable] means virtually 
indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction 
would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”209  
The statute further goes on to note that the “definition does not apply to depictions that are 
drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults,”210 something that was a 
key concern for the Court in Ashcroft.  In addition to changing the language in § 2256(8)(B), it 
gave that subsection a new, somewhat narrower, definition of “sexually explicit conduct.”  When 
a real actual child is involved, “sexually explicit conduct” is defined by subsection (2)(A) as 
“actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or 
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; 
(iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
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person.”211  However for purposes of virtual child pornography as defined by § 2256(8)(B), 
“sexually explicit conduct” is controlled by subsection (2)(B) which defines it as  
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, 
or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or lascivious 
simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals, breast, or pubic area of any 
person is exhibited; 
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated: bestiality; masturbation; or sadistic or 
masochistic abuse; or 
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person.
212
 
 
Thus, conduct that is sexually explicit under § 2256(2)(A) is only sexually explicit under 
subsection (2)(B) if it is lascivious. 
 The Act deleted § 2256(8)(D), the second of the two sections that the Court in Ashcroft 
had found unconstitutionally overbroad, which had defined child pornography as “a visual 
depiction advertised, promoted, presented, described or distributed in such a manner that conveys 
the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.”213  It moved the “pandering” language to a revised § 2252A(a)(3)(B), which 
would find someone guilty if he 
(3) knowingly . . . 
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or 
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any 
material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is 
intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or 
contains— 
(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
or 
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
214
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This replaced the “conveys the impression” language from subsection (8)(D) of the CPPA with 
the more narrowly circumscribed “in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause 
another to believe” language of § 2252A(a)(3)(B). 
 The Act also added a new subsection to § 2252A.  Subsection (a)(6) prohibits 
“knowingly distributing, etc., a visual depiction to a minor where such visual depiction is, or 
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, for purposes of inducing or 
persuading a minor to participate in any activity that is illegal.”215  This includes virtual child 
pornography; i.e. if virtual child pornography was distributed to a minor for purposes of inducing 
or persuading the minor to participate in an illegal activity, that would be in violation of § 
2252A(a)(6).  This is consistent with what Justice Kennedy said in Ashcroft, that “‘[t]he 
Government . . . may punish adults who provide unsuitable materials to children,’ citing 
Ginsberg v. New York [390 U.S. 629 (1967)].”216 
 The Act also added § 1466A, which was later held to be unconstitutional by the Court in 
U.S. v. Handley, 564 F.Supp.2d 996 (2008). 
B. United States v. Williams 
 In 2008, the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act’s pandering provision was addressed 
in United States v. Williams.  The defendant, after posting links of child pornography in a public 
Internet chat room, was charged with one count of pandering child pornography under § 
2252A(a)(3)(B) and one count of possessing child pornography under § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
217
.  He 
challenged the pandering provision, which was added under the PROTECT Act, discussed supra.  
This section was added by Congress because it “was concerned that limiting the child-
pornography prohibition to material that could be proved to feature actual children . . . would 
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enable many child pornographers to evade conviction.”218  Congress felt that with new 
technology and pictures being repeatedly transmitted over the internet, it could make it almost 
impossible to prove that a particular picture was produced with real children as the subjects.
219
 
 The pandering statute promulgated in PROTECT differs from the statutes that were 
covered in Ferber, Osborne, and Ashcroft, in that it does not target the underlying material, but 
instead “bans the collateral speech that introduces such material into the child-pornography 
distribution network.”220  Therefore if a person possesses virtual child pornography, which is 
allowed under Ashcroft, but advertises it as depicting actual children, he violates the statute.
221
 
 The Court in Williams concluded that the words in the pandering statute that dealt with 
transactions, did not just relate to commercial transactions, but in many cases could be “carried 
out by individual amateurs who seek no financial reward. To run afoul of the statute, the speech 
need only accompany or seek to induce the transfer of child pornography from one person to 
another.”222  Because the statute was not limited to commercial transactions, the Court subjected 
“the content-based restriction of the PROTECT Act pandering provision to strict scrutiny.”223 
 The Williams Court noted as a rationale for the statute “the principle that offers to give or 
receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no 
First Amendment protection.”224  In other words, because it is unlawful to possess real child 
pornography, it is also unlawful to offer to give or request to receive it.  The Court distinguished 
between a proposal to engage in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy of illegality.  For 
example, if someone went online and said “I think possessing child pornography should be legal 
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because it is fun to look at,” this would merely be advocating child pornography.  However, if he 
then went on to say “I have images of actual child pornography, who wants to trade,” this would 
be a proposal to engage in illegal activity.  The Court found that the Act did “not prohibit 
advocacy of child pornography, but only offers to provide or requests to obtain it.”225  This, the 
Court said, fell well within constitutional bounds, unlike the pandering provision that was at 
issue in Ashcroft, which the Court found to be constitutionally defective for going “beyond 
pandering to prohibit possession of material that could not otherwise be proscribed.”226  The 
Court held that “offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically 
excluded from the First Amendment.”227  As long as the defendant “hold[s], and make[s] a 
statement that reflects, the belief that the material is child pornography; or that he 
communicate[s] in a manner intended to cause another so to believe,”228 his actions will 
implicate the statute. 
 While the PROTECT Act makes the pandering of virtual child pornography as real child 
pornography illegal, the Court made sure to note that its decision did not overrule Ashcroft.  It in 
no way provided Congress with an “end run around the First Amendment’s protection of virtual 
child pornography by prohibiting proposals to transact in such images rather than prohibiting the 
images themselves.”229  The Court stressed the fact that the statute did not prohibit the offer to 
provide or request to receive virtual child pornography, so long as it was not being pandered as 
containing actual children. 
A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to 
believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children.  It is 
simply not true that this means “a protected category of expression [will] 
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inevitably be suppressed,” [ ].  Simulated child pornography will be as available 
as ever, so long as it is offered and sought as such, and not as real child 
pornography.
230
 
 
While the PROTECT Act takes the right step forward, it unfortunately does not go far enough.  
The Court in Williams held that the statute criminalizing the pandering or solicitation of child 
pornography was not overbroad under the First Amendment, and was not impermissibly vague 
under the Due Process Clause.  Regrettably though, the Court still reiterated its holding in 
Ashcroft that the mere possession of virtual child pornography is protected free speech under the 
First Amendment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Technology in general seems to be advancing at an ever increasing speed.  Computer 
technology in particular has gotten to a point where it has become increasingly difficult to 
differentiate between virtual images and their real-life counterparts.  Although the Court in 
Ashcroft found no compelling interests for prohibiting the possession of virtual child 
pornography, due to technological advances in the nine years since that decision, the Court 
would be wise to readdress the issue once more.  As discussed above, virtual child pornography 
poses just as much indirect harm to children as the harm posed by actual child pornography.  
Although no real children are used in the production of digital child pornography, it can still be 
used by pedophiles to harm future children.  While the Court briefly touched on the subject in 
Williams, where it upheld the pandering provision found in the PROTECT Act of 2003, it 
unfortunately once again reaffirmed its position in Ashcroft, stating that so long as it is not 
offered and sought as real child pornography, virtual child pornography would be protected 
under the First Amendment and be “as available as ever.”231  If the Court truly feels that 
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“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor”232 and preventing the 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children “constitute[s] a government objective of surpassing 
importance,”233 then it needs to overturn its decision in Ashcroft.  The only way to close the 
distribution network and dry up the market for child pornography is for the Court to no longer 
distinguish between actual and virtual child pornography, but instead prohibit both.  Just like real 
child pornography, virtual child pornography has little to no social value, and thus has no place 
in a society as advanced and civilized as ours.  As such, the Court should classify virtual child 
pornography as a category of material wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. 
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